297_R88_2010_Edinburgh_Law_Review_Rez._M._Gagarin.pdf by Thür, Gerhard
GERHARD THÜR
http://epub.oeaw.ac.at/gerhard-thuer
 
gerhard.thuer@oeaw.ac.at 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/antike/index.php?id=292 
 
Dieses Dokument darf ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke genutzt werden (Lizenz CC BY-NC-ND), 
gewerbliche Nutzung wird urheberrechtlich verfolgt. 
 
This document is for scientific use only (license CC BY-NC-ND), commercial use of copyrighted material will be prosecuted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. 297 (Rezension / Review, 2010) 
 
 
Michael Gagarin, Writing Greek Law (Cambridge 
2008) 
 
 
Edinburgh Law Review 14/2, 2010, 333–335 
 
 
© 2016 Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh) mit freundlicher Genehmigung 
(http://www.euppublishing.com/) 
 
 
 
Schlagwörter: Gesetzesinschriften 
 
 
Key Words: statutes written on stone 
Vol 14 2010 REVIEWS 333 
EdinLR Vol 14 pp 333-335 
DOI: 10.3366/EI364980910001484 
Michael Gagarin, WRITING GREEK LAW 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org), 2008. xi + 282 pp. ISBN 
978052188661 . f55 . 
In recent decades orality and writing in ancient Creek culture have become fashionable topics. 
In his Early Creek Law (1986) Michael Cagarin held a theoretical position based on Maine's 
Ancient Law (l861) and Hart's The Concept of Law (1961), namely that before writing one 
cannot gene rally speak of law. Without entering that broad philosophical discussion, the late 
Raymond Westbrook's refutation of such evolutionary models should nevertheless be noted. 
From Ancient Near Eastem sources Westbrook demonstrated that human societies used highly 
developed legal rules long be fore writing came into existence (see "The Early History of Law" 
(2010) 127 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Rom Abt) 1). Classicists have 
also recently tended not to explain the origin of la\\' in a philosophical way, but rather to focus 
on the question of why writing in archaic Creece - borrowed from the Phoenicians around 750 
BC - very soon produced legal texts, and what inAuence writing had on the development of 
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Creek law. Cagarin also now follows a strictly empirical approach. His new book is based on 
studying the earliest stone inscriptions, mostly from Crete. His conclusion is that the reason for 
publishing statutes on stone was the free access to law for every citizen. 
The book is divided into ten chapters with appendiees including Creek texts cited in 
the various chapters. Following the book as a whole, the Introduction and Conclusion are 
both entitled "Writing Creek Law". Introducing his topie, Cagarin scrutinises in turn the 
implications of each of the three words of his title. He not es in relation to writing how, by 
adding signs for vowels to those for consonants, the Creeks first invented a fully a1phabetic 
script, easily legible for everybody. He then states that his examination of law and writing in 
Creece is necessarily eonfined to the period after the Bronze Age, c1arif)'ing that the earlier 
prehistoric period of Creek civilisation falls outside his treatment. In terms of law, Cagarin 
stresses a non-positivist view that "Iaw may be a forum for regulating and even promoting 
conRict, and for negotiating eommunity values, but at the same time, it prevents conHiet from 
becoming warfare" (4). Summing up, Cagarin's most significant conclusions are that, in Creeee, 
law began \vitll an oral period. Following this period writing was used only for public legislation. 
Everybody had direct access to the statutes, written in ordinary, non-technicallanguage . Legal 
professionals were absent. In contrast, trial proeedure a1ways remained oral , making law 
accessible to aIl members of the eommunity. "To this end, Creek legislation regularly includes 
information about proeedure so that tll0se involved in litigation eould learn for tllemselves, 
witilOut professional help, how they needed to proeeed" (243). These were also, so Cagarin 
argues, the features creating a unity of Creek law joining both democratie and oligarchie 
states. 
In an exposition as aeeessible to a non-specialist reader as to a speeialist one, Cagarin 
develops tllese ideas ehapter by chapter. "Law before Writing" (eh 1) deals with the poems 
of Homer and Hesiod, whieh reHeet law onl)' indireetly. Undoubtedly the trial depieted 
on the shield of Aehilles (Homer, Iliad 18.497-508) was oral; however, many questions 
remain open. Denying that "oral laws" constituted binding statutes, Cagarin maintains that 
"oral law" regulated disputes (33) . 'Writing and Written Laws" (eh 2) eombines the issue 
of Iiteraey - writing for private use is doeumented from 750 BC - with the first written 
statutes from about one hundred years later. This chapter gives an aceount of the physieal 
appearanee and the eontent of some twenty of the oldest stone inseriptions, mostly from 
Crete. Some were prominently published on temple walls, the Ion gest with two Iines of 
fifteen metres each. In 'Why the Creeks Wrote Laws" (eh 3), opposing the views of 
many other scholars, Cagarin denies that politieal or social tensions were the reason for 
legislation and the "monumentalisation" of its produets before an illiterate audienee. The 
entire citizenry, he holds, enacted the laws and most citizens were able to read tllem; detailed 
legal provisions became neeessary beeause of the increasingl)' eomplex legal situation in 
the - peaeefully - expanding arehaic Creek communities. 
In chronological order the focus switches to Athens : 'Why Draeo Wrote his Homicide Law" 
(eh 4). Comparing the Iiterary style with that of eontemporary geometrie vase painting, Cagarin 
stresses the indisputedly high teehnieal quality of Draco's legislation (621/20 BC). However, the 
reason why Draco enacted his statutes on homieide will remain a matter of dispute. To explain it 
\vith the general pattern of demographieal extension seems to be insufficient. Asound minority 
of scholars conneets it to the Cylonian slaughter about fifteen years before. In an)' event, 
Draeo's law code was reall egislation, argued by Cagarin to "represent a stage in the gradual 
development of a more eompulsory judicial proeedure" (103). In "Oral and Written in Archaie 
Creek Law" (eh 5), procedure in Athens is the foeus. Basically trials were performed orall)', 
dike (action) being contrasted ",1jth a special kind of written indictment (gmphe) introdueed 
later, most probably by Solon. Witness depositions were oral and, be fore the fourth eentury 
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BC, did not have to be filed as wlitten documents. It should be said that the function of the 
archaic thesmothetai must still be regarded as unclear, despite Cagarin's own explanation for 
their role (115). Moreover, the chapter overlooks the importance private documents already 
had in archaie times. However, trials themselves were of course oral and every document had 
to be introduced by oral witness testimony. 
The next two chapters return to Crete. "Writing Laws in Fifth-Century Cortyn" (ch 6) 
examines the structure and style of statutes and early law codes. Hut "Writing the Cortyn 
Code" (ch 7) is the core of the book. About 450 BC the famous Law Code 01' twelve columns 
(621 lines) was published on a stone wall and was ni ne metres in length. It did not come out of 
nothing. Crotynian legislators were able to formulate, organise, and publish laws in a technicaUy 
perfect way. Comparing the Code with the Codex Hammurabi, Cagarin stresses the progress in 
"micro organisation" and the use of cross-references and retro-activity c1auses. The Cortynian 
inscription was not royal or political propaganda, but rather enacted by the citizens, and from 
its appearance it was easily accessible to everyone for everyday practicaluse in litigation. 
Legislation and trial procedure in c1assical Athens are well-known. 'vVriting Law in Classieal 
Athens" (ch 8) first explores democratic legislation. After restitution of democracy at the 
end of the Peloponnesian war, re-writing the laws was necessalY. In this special connection 
the term "unwritten law" (agmphos nomos) was introduced, not to be conflated (as Cagalin 
wams (185» with its philosophical aspect. In litigation , hearings before the popular court 
(dikasterion) always remained oral, but documents to be read to the judges were presented 
in preliminary hearings before the magistrate. Cenerally, there is no doubt about aU these 
observations. But, problematically, written legislation, contrasting with the restricted use of 
writing for litigation, is seen as a feature for the unity of Creek law (197). The next chapter 
also seems problematic: "vVriting Athenian Law: a Comparative Perspective" (ch 9 ). Cagarin 
correctly stresses the restricted role of legal professionals in Athens: in contrast to Rome there 
was no formalism or ob sc ure words to be explained by jurists. However, he misunderstands 
the Roman formula enacted by the pmetor as formalism (218) and is seemingly not aware 
that trials before the iudex privattlS or the recupemtores were also oral. Cagarin's criteria for 
"unity" would also encompass Roman law. Furthermore, though interesting, the remarks on 
English common law do not particularly help in understanding the law of the Creek city-states 
(poleis ). 
"\ <Vriting Law in Hellenistic Creece" (ch 10) has a twofold topie. On the one hand, legislation 
and litigation did not change substantiaUy in the poleis under Hellenistic rulers. On the other 
hand, the Ptolemaic kingdom was so different that Cagarin, incorrectly, excludes its law from 
Creek traditions (243). Admittedly, administration and legislation changed and (by chance) 
hundreds of thousands of papyrus documents drafted by professional notaries are preserved, 
but tl1e broad field of private law here es capes Cagarin's attention . The substantive law of sale, 
leasing, credit, mortgage etc followed exactly tl1e patterns well-known from the Creek poleis. 
To neglect an essential segment of law - private law - from the topic of writing is a weak point 
in Cagarin's otherwise brilliant analys is. 
The merits of the book nevertheless prevail. Cagarin draws attention to the physieal 
appearance of Creek legislation published on stone. He stresses the accessibility of law to 
the citizens both in democratic and in oligarchie regimes. The absence of professionals like 
the Roman iuris consulti is evident. But at least in Athens, a litigant needed another kind of 
professional to win bis case, the speech writer (logogmphos). Whether the rule of law was 
better in Creece (254 ff) or in Rome remains an open question . 
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